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1061

ToRTS-DUTY TO CONTROL CONDUCT OF ANOTHER-DUTY OF INFANT
PASSENGER OWNER TO CONTROL INFANT DRIVER-Plaintiff's decedent, an
infant twenty years of age, owned an automobile which was being driven by a
lad of seventeen at the request of decedent who, with a girl companion, occupied
the rear seat of the automobile. The infant driver did not have a driver's
license.1 Plaintiff, as administratrix of the estat~ of the decedent brought an
action under the Death Act 2 for damages arising from the death of the decedent which occurred as a result of a collision between the automobile and de19 Seidman, "Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938," 17 TAXES 341 (1939).
Five classes of cases are affected by the section.
1. Double inclusion of an item in gross income.
2. Double allowance of a deduction or credit.
3. Double exclusion of an item of gross income when tax has been paid on the
second exclusion.
4. Correlative deductions and inclusions specified in§ 162(6) and (c).
5. Determination of basis of property where there has been erroneous treatment
of a transaction upon which such basis depends. For analysis of these classes see Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, "Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938," 48 YALE
L. ]. 509, 719 (1939). See also 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION,
c. 14 (1942).
20 The chief objection is to the omission of double disallowance from section 3801.
No way has been found to include this situation without defeating the substance of the
statutes of limitations. See Bayly and Dickson, "Bad Debts and Section 3801: A Proposal," 18 TAXES 599 (1940), for proposed amendments. ·
21 Proceedings of the Seventh Tax Clinic of the American Bar Assn., 16 TAX
MAN. 663 (1938).
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fondant's locomotive. There was evidence bearing upon the defendant's negligence and negligence on the part of the infant driver. The trial court charged
the jury that if they found the driver of the car was negligent, such negligence
should be imputed to the decedent passenger owner, foreclosing plaintiff's recovery. On appeal, held, affirmed; while the charge to the jury was not
literally accurate, it was not error as to the question presented on appeal. Parks
v. Pere Marquette Railway Co.;315 Mich. 38, 23 N.W. (2d) 196 (1946).
, In its opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized the probable inaccuracy of the term "imputed negligence," 3 and at least by implication approved
the suggestion often made by legal scholars that in a case of this type, the owner
passenger is really being charged with "primary"- negligence.4 The typical case
of this sort is of interest because of its close resemblance to cases in which the
negligence of another may be imputed to a principal, master or to joint enterprisers. But here the owner passenger was not held responsible on the basis of
vicarious liability but was held negligent oy reason of the breach of the personal
duty to control the driver. Though the mere fact that the owner or possessor of
a cha~el permits another to use it, otherwise than as servant or agent, is not in
itself regarded as sufficient to make such owner or possessor responsible for the
negligent manner in which the chattel is used,5 yet it is enough to require that
an owner or possessor of an automobile, if present, exercise with reasonable care
that ability which the possession and ownership gives him to control the driver
so that the latter will not create unreasonable risks to others.6 In what appears
to be the original case of this type, decided over one hundred years ago, 7 the
liability of the possessor of a horse and carriage who permitted a guest to drive
was involved. The plaintiff was injured by the negligent acts of the driver while
the possessor was in the carriage. The English court held the possessor liable,
apparently not for the negligence of the driver, but for the possessor's fault in
failing to prevent the driver from being negligent. 8 But in very few of the cases
where this question has been involved, have the courts sharply distinguished between vicarious liability and liability for the owner's negligence. Many courts
have attempted to rationalize the result by reference to the doctrine of responPrincipal case at 43.
See Harper and Kime, '.'The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another," 43
YALE L. J. 886 (1934) •. ,
5
ToRTS RESTATEMENT, c. 12, § 318, comment a (1934). An owner of a motor
vehicle is not liable, though present as a passenger when he has bailed the automobile to
a third person, when the bailee is not using the vehicle in the owner's.business, Hartley
v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 130 N.W. 336 (1911). But on further questions of liability concerned with bailments of automobiles, examine also cases decided under appropriate owners' liability statute. Should an owner's liability be pred.icated on such
a statute on the facts similar to the, principal case? See Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N.Y.
344, 178 N.E. 553 (1931).
6 As to the scope of the duty, must the owner passenger be constantly. on the
alert to discover dangers of which the driver is unaware? _See ToRTS RESTATEMENT,
c. 12, § 318, comment c (1934).
7
Wheatley v. Patrick, 2 M. & W. 650, 150 Eng. Rep. 917 (1837). For full
discussion of this case see Harper and Kime, "The Duty to Control the Conduct of
Another," 43 YALE L. J. 886 (1934).
8
2 M. & W. 650 at 652.
3
4
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deat superior. 9 Certainly the existence of a duty on the part of the owneroccupant to control the driver is hard to deny in the principal case, for if there
was evidence that the owner alloweq an incompetent person 10 to drivf? the
vehicle, the conclusion cannot be resisted that the owner was under a legal obligation to control the conduct of such incompetent driver when he was present in
the car with him. Thus the court properly did not confuse the issue of the infant owner's direct contributory negligence in the duty problem before it with
the question of whether an infant principal is responsible for the negligent acts of
an agent. 11 Since the decision of the Michigan court in the principal case, a recent opinion by Parker, J., of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in the case of Whitley v. Powell 12 offers an interesting basis of comparison.
In this case the contributory negligence of the driver of an automobile was
"imputed" to the plaintiff owner-occupant, who~ the evidence showed was a
moron with the intelligence of a twelve year old child, thus precluding recovery
against the defendant, receivers of the Seaboard Air Line Railway. Although the
point was raised, the court refused to consider whether the plaintiff was guilty of
direct contributory negligence. 13 Instead, it based its decision on the conventional agency theory. 14 Obviously, if the court wished to invoke the "duty"
analysis, it is enough to say that as to the mental attributes of the moron occupant, the standard of care required is an external one 15-the supposed conduct
9
See PROSSER, LAw OF ToRT 499, 500 (1941). Compare McMahen v. White,
30 Pa. Super. 169 (1906), with Beaudoin v. Mahaney, 131 Me. II8, 159 A. 567
(1932). But see Wheeler v. Darmochwat, 280 Mass. 553, 183 N.E. 55 (1932).
Examine also Mendolia v. White, 313 Mass. 318, 47 N.E. (2d) 294 (1943); Guy v.
Union Street Railway, 289 Mass. 225, 193 N.E. 740 (1935); Jones v. Carey, 219
Ind. 268, 37 N.E. (2d) 944 (1941); Harper v. Harper, 225 N.C. 260, 34 S.E. (2d)
185 (1945); Wisconsin & Arkansas Lbr. Co. v. Brady, 157 Ark. 449, 248 S.W. 278
(1923).
10
The driver did not have a license required by statute; see note 1, supra.
11
See McKerall v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., (Springfield, Mo., Ct. App.
1923) 257 S.W. 166 (1923); Wilson v. Moudy, 22 Tenn. App. 356, 123 S.W.
(2d) 828 (1938); Wilson v. Mullen, II Tenn. App. 319 (1930); Atchison T. & S.
Ry. Co. v. McNulty, (C.C.A. 8th, 1922) 285 F. 97. Compare with the above
cases, Masterson v. Leonard, II6 Wash. 551, 200 P. 320 (1921); and Robinson v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 179 S.C. 493, 184 S.E. 96 (1936). See also Pope v.
Halpern, 193 Cal. 168 at 176, 223 P. 470 (1924). Examine the analysis of Scott v.
Schisler, 107 N.J. 397, 153 A. 395 (1931) in 44 HARV. L. REV. 1292 (1931).
12
Whitley v. Powell, (C.C.A. 4th, 1946) 159 F. (2d) 625.
1
13
Id. at 628.
u. The court stated that the test of whether the doctrine of imputed negligence is
applicable to this type of case is: "Did the owner, under the circumstances disclosed,
have the legal right to control the manner in which the automobile was being operated. • •. If the owner possessed the right to control, that he did not exercise it is
immaterial.••. Plaintiff, although not o_f a high mentality, was not a child, but a person of full age and sui juris. She had legal right and power to appoint an agent or
servant, and there was no reason why she could not assume toward Noble (the driver) a
relationship to which in the language of Harper v. Harper, .•. 'the law of agency is
applied.' " Whitley v. Powell, id. at 628.
15
But suppose the owner-occupant is insane? See PROSSER, I.Aw OF ToRT 1092
(1941).
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under similar circumstances of the reasonable man of ordinary prudence.16
Irrespective of whether or not it is desirable to hold an owner of an automobile,
present as a passenger when it is driven by another, liable on a "duty" theory
or an agency one, certainly a factor which has influenced courts in this area has
been the alarming increase in traffic accidents, together with the frequent financial irresponsibility of the individual driving the car. As Prosser states it, this
factor "has led to a search for some basis for imposing liability upon the owner
of the vehicle, even thoug4 he is free from negligence himself. Bluntly put, it is
felt that, since automobiles are expensive, the owner is more likely to be able to
pay for any damage than the driver, and that he is the obvious person to carry
the necessary insurance to cover the risk." 17 But where the owner occupant is a
plaintiff in an action, is not the question of which legal theory will be employed
crucial? In this situation, it is submitted that he should be charged only with the
duty of exercising reasonable care.

John F. O'Connor, S.Ed.

§

See ToRTS RESTATEMENT, c. 12, 283
17 PROSSER, LAW OF ToRT 499 (1941).

16

(1934).

